An exciting new development in differential privacy is the shuffled model, which makes it possible to circumvent the large error lower bounds that are typically incurred in the local model, while relying on much weaker trust assumptions than in the central model. In this work, we study two basic statistical problems, namely, heavy hitters and d-dimensional range counting queries, in the shuffled model of privacy. For both problems we devise algorithms with polylogarithmic communication per user and polylogarithmic error; a direct consequence is an algorithm for approximating the median with similar communication and error. These bounds significantly improve on what is possible in the local model of differential privacy, where the error must provably grow polynomially with the number of users.
Introduction
Consider a data set x 1 , . . . , x n distributed among n users for which we wish to be able to compute or approximate some function qpx 1 , . . . , x n q without compromising the privacy of user data. Specifically, we consider the setting where q comes from a family Q of queries, and we wish to preprocess x 1 , . . . , x n in such a way that we can answer any query in Q without further participation of the users. Let rBs " t1, . . . , Bu. We focus on two fundamental classes of queries:
• For data values x i Ă rBs, a frequency query q y px 1 , . . . , x n q " |ti | y P x i u| counts the number of occurrences of a particular value y P rBs. • For data values x i P rBs d , a d-dimensional cube, a range counting query q R px 1 , . . . , x n q " |ti | x i P Ru| determines how many users hold a vector in a given axis-aligned rectangle R. We note that accurate frequency queries allow us to compute heavy hitters, i.e., the most frequent values among x 1 , . . . , x n . Moreover, accurate range counting queries allow us to approximate the median of the input in the sense of M-estimation 1 , i.e., finding a valuex that approximately minimizes ř i |x i´x |. Differential privacy is a well-studied framework for answering queries in a privacy-preserving manner. Given a family Q of queries, differentially private query release [28] computes a single value Rpx 1 , . . . , x n q such that for every q P Q we can compute an approximation of qpx 1 , . . . , x n q from Rpx 1 , . . . , x n q. A key insight in differential privacy is that it is often possible to sample Rpx 1 , . . . , x n q from a distribution such that the statistical information about each user input x i that can be learned from Rpx 1 , . . . , x n q is small. Specifically, the distribution of Rpx 1 , . . . , x n q should remain roughly the same if we replace x i by some other value x 1 i . Most work in differential privacy has been done in the central model where some trusted entity curates all inputs and computes the value Rpx 1 , . . . , x n q. In privacy-sensitive settings, there may not exist a single entity that all users trust enough to surrender their data. For this reason, deployments of differential privacy [31, 22, 3] have been done in the so-called local model of differential privacy, where the computation of Rpx 1 , . . . , x n q is distributed among users. More specifically, user i computes a value R 1 px i q dependent only on their own input and releases it, after which R 1 px 1 q, . . . , R 1 px n q are combined by a central server to compute Rpx 1 , . . . , x n q. This means that the local computation at user i determines how much information about x i is revealed. Since R 1 px i q and R 1 px 1 i q need to have nearly identical distributions for any choice of x 1 i , the output of R 1 cannot depend too strongly on its input, which suggests the need for R 1 to inject sufficient "noise" to obfuscate the input. For many kinds of queries, it is known that privacy is possible in the local model with additive error that grows sublinearly in n, often of order Op ? nq. Unfortunately, this tends to be significantly more than what is possible in the central model, with the result that n needs to be very large to get similarly precise results.
Shuffled model. Bittau et al. [10] introduced the Encode-Shuffle-Analyze (ESA) framework as a "middle ground" between central and local differential privacy. The idea is to combine random shuffling of data with local randomness introduced by users. The shuffling of all user outputs (each user can send any number of messages to the shuffler) can be implemented in a way that does not expose user data, yet is practical, robust, and scalable for example using the cryptographic primitive of a mixnet (see the discussion in [16] ). This has the effect of hiding the origin of each data item or anonymizing the outputs of local computations, which turns out to enable private protocols with error far lower than what is possible in the local model while not requiring one to place the same level of trust in the curator as in the central model. Cheu et al. [16] provided a formalization of the core components of the framework, which we refer to as the shuffled model, illustrated in Figure 1 . The ESA framework can be viewed as a lightweight alternative to secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols. We discuss these further in Section 1.1 but note for now that in contrast to the ESA model, such protocols rely on user participation for every query that has to be evaluated and generally do not protect against a series of adaptive queries revealing private information.
Our results. We present new algorithms for private frequency estimation (see Theorem 3.6) and range counting (see Theorems 4.9 and 4.10) in the shuffled model that significantly improve on what can be achieved in the local model of differential privacy. Our results are summarized in Table 1 , focusing on communication requirements of Figure 1 : Computation in the shuffled model consists of local randomization of inputs in the first stage, followed by a shuffle of all outputs of the local randomizers, after which the shuffled output is passed on to an analyzer. users, the size of the additive error on query answers, and the time required to answer a query (after creating a data structure based on the shuffled dataset).
To our best knowledge, the only previously-known upper bounds for these problems in the shuffled model (going beyond local differential privacy) followed via a reduction to private aggregation [16] . Using the currently best protocol for private aggregation in the shuffled model [4, 32] yields the result stated in the first row of Table 1 .
Interestingly, our results are not far from the best results obtainable in the central model. For instance, the best possible error in the central model for frequency estimation is Θpminplog 1 δ , log Bqq [45] . For d-dimensional range counting, the best-known upper bound on error is plogpBq`logpnq Opdq q{ε [27] , though we note that for d " 1, it is possible to get a much better dependence on B [12] .
Overview of techniques. Our protocols use the privacy blanket tool of Balle et al. [5] , which introduces noise by letting some users send uniformly random messages to the shuffler, forming a noise "blanket." Informally, it suffices that each possible message output of the shuffler has a fair probability of having originated from the blanket, which ensues if the number of distinct messages is well below the blanket size.
For the frequency estimation problem with shared randomness (i.e., all users can make use of the same hash functions), our protocol is based on the count-min sketch [19] , which can be efficiently implemented in the shuffled model. Indeed, all possible updates to a count-min sketch can be described using a small number of messages (indexes into the sketch) and we show that count-min frequency estimates are noise-robust and do not deteriorate when blanket noise is added to the sketch. For the frequency estimation problem without public randomness, we devise a protocol based on the Hadamard response technique [2, 1] but for the shuffled model. Compared to the local model, in which this technique was previously applied, it turns out that we can afford to include much more information in each message about a data item, again due to the privacy blanket.
Our protocol for range queries is based on a collection B of OpB log d Bq d-dimensional rectangles in rBs d with the property that an arbitrary rectangle can be formed as the disjoint union of Oplog d Bq rectangles from B. Furthermore, each point in rBs d is contained in Oplog d Bq rectangles from B. The existence of such a collection is well-known in the literature on range reporting, e.g., one can take the Cartesian product of sets of dyadic intervals in each dimension. The idea is now to privately approximate the number of points in each rectangle in B using our frequency estimation protocol as a black box. To turn this into a protocol with small maximum communication in the shuffled model, we develop an approach analogous to the matrix mechanism [39, 40] .
Remark. Some recent work [30, 5] has established generic results showing that shuffling provides privacy amplification of locally differentially private protocols. In particular, for an pε, 0q-differentially private local randomizer, one can construct a protocol in the shuffled model that isˆOˆe ε b logp1{δq n˙, δ˙-differentially private and with the same level of accuracy. While one can combine this amplification result with local differentially private protocols to 
Frequency estimation (private randomness) Section 3.5 Table 1 : Overview of results on differentially private query release in the shuffled model. For frequency estimation each user is assumed to hold k " 1 value from rBs. The query time stated is the additional time to answer a query, assuming a preprocessing of the output of the shuffler that takes time linear in its length. Note that frequencies and counts are not normalized, i.e., they are integers in t0, . . . , nu. For simplicity, constant factors are suppressed, the bounds are stated for error probability β " B´O p1q , and the following are assumed: dimension d is a constant, n is bounded above by B, and δ ă 1{ log B.
obtain protocols in the shuffled model, there are two drawbacks. First, the resulting guarantees can be weaker since the amplification result holds only for relatively small values of ε (namely, ε " Oplogpn{ logp1{δqqq) [5] . Indeed, using the locally differentially private protocol RAPPOR [31, 2] and the privacy amplification result, one can obtain a frequency estimation protocol in the shuffled model with errorÕpn 1{4 q; in contrast, our protocol has errorÕp1q. Second, the shuffled model protocols derived using privacy amplification are necessarily single-message protocols; we suspect that frequency estimation with errorÕp1q may not be possible in the single-message shuffled model.
Further related work
There have been several recent works that study differentially private algorithms in the central or local models for various statistical and learning tasks [25, 43, 47, 8, 14, 13, 15] . More recently, the shuffled model [10, 16] has emerged as a middle ground between central and local differential privacy. A number of works have sought to formalize the trade-offs in the shuffled model with respect to standard local and central differential privacy [30] as well as devise private schemes in this model for tasks such as secure aggregation [4, 16, 5, 32] . Our work is largely motivated by the aforementioned body of works demonstrating the power of the shuffled model, namely, its ability to enable private protocols with lower error than in the local model while placing less trust in a central server or curator.
The specific problems we consider in the shuffled model, namely, range counting, M-estimation of the median, heavy hitters, as well as tightly connected problems such as interquartile range, have been well motivated in the literature and studied in the context of differential privacy in the central and local models. Dwork and Lei [25] initiated work on establishing a connection between differential privacy and robust statistics, and were able to provide differentially private estimators for median as well as interquartile range, α-trimmed mean, and regression. Subsequently, Lei [38] provided an approach for privately releasing a wide class of M-estimators (including for median) that are statistically consistent. While such M-estimators can also be obtained indirectly from non-interactive release of the density function [47] , the aforementioned approach exhibits an improved rate of convergence. Furthermore, motivated by risk bounds under privacy constraints, Duchi et al. [23] provided private versions of information-theoretic bounds for minimax risk of M-estimation of the median.
Range counting queries have also been an important subject of study. Early works on differentially private histograms [24, 33] apply naturally to range queries, though the approach of summing up histogram entries yields large errors for longer range queries. Xiao et al. [48] showed how to obtain differentially private range count queries by using Haar wavelets, while Hay et al. [34] formalized the method of maintaining a hierarchical representation of data; the aforementioned two works were compared and refined by Qardaji et al. [42] . Cormode et al. [17] showed how to translate many of the previous ideas to the local model of differential privacy. The matrix mechanism of Li et al. [39, 40] also applies to the problem of range counting queries. An alternate line of work for tackling multi-dimensional range queries that relied on conceiving differentially private versions of k-d trees and quadtrees was presented by Cormode et al. [20] . Finally, Bun et al. [12] also considered the related problem of differentially private release for learning threshold functions.
Heavy hitters and frequency estimation, which we also consider in this work, have also been studied extensively in the standard models of differential privacy [7, 6, 11, 35, 46, 1] .
Secure multi-party computation. If we accept user involvement in the computation of each query q, then there is a rich theory of secure multi-party computation (SMPC) that allows f px 1 , . . . , x n q to be computed without revealing anything about x i except what can be inferred from f px 1 , . . . , x n q itself (see e.g., the book of Cramer et al. [21] ). Generic SMPC protocols have large overheads compared to the cost of computing f px 1 , . . . , x n q in a non-private setting. Kilian et al. [37] studied SMPC protocols for heavy hitters, obtaining near-linear communication complexity. We are not aware of any work on optimizing SMPCs for range queries. Note that the fact that f px 1 , . . . , x n q is revealed means that SMPC protocols do not protect privacy in the strong sense required for differential privacy. In particular, it can be hard to quantify the privacy in situations where many SMPC computations are executed on the same data.
Preliminaries
For any positive integer B, let rBs " t1, 2, . . . , Bu. For any set Y, we denote by Y˚the set consisting of sequences of elements of Y, i.e., Y˚" Ť ně0 Y n . Suppose S is a multiset whose elements are drawn from a set X . With a slight abuse of notation, we will write S Ă X and for x P X , we write m S pxq to denote the multiplicity of x in S. For an element x P X and a non-negative integer k, let kˆtxu denote the multiset with k copies of x (e.g., 3ˆtxu " tx, x, xu).
We now introduce the basics of differential privacy that we will need. Fix a finite set X , the space of reports of users. A dataset is an element of X˚, namely a tuple consisting of elements of X . Let histpXq P N |X | be the histogram of X: for any x P X , the xth component of histpXq is the number of occurrences of x in the dataset X. We will consider datasets X, X 1 to be equivalent if they have the same histogram (i.e., the ordering of the elements x 1 , . . . , x n does not matter). For a multiset S whose elements are in X , we will also write histpSq to denote the histogram of S (so that the xth component is the number of copies of x in S).
Let n P N, and consider a dataset X " px 1 , . . . , x n q P X n . For an element x P X , let f X pxq " histpXqx n be the frequency of x in X, namely the fraction of elements of X which are equal to x. Two datasets X, X 1 are said to be neighboring if they differ in a single element, meaning that we can write (up to equivalence) X " px 1 , . . . , x n´1 , x n q and X 1 " px 1 , . . . , x n´1 , x 1 n q. In this case, we write X " X 1 . Let Z be a set; we now define the differential privacy of a randomized function P : X n Ñ Z: Definition 2.1 (Differential privacy [26, 24] ). A randomized algorithm P : X n Ñ Z is pε, δq-differentially private if for every pair of neighboring datasets X " X 1 and for every set S Ă Z, we have PrP pXq P Ss ď e ε¨P rP pX 1 q P Ss`δ, where the probabilities are taken over the randomness in P . Here, ε ě 0, δ P r0, 1s.
We will use the following compositional property of differential privacy. Lemma 2.1 (Post-processing, e.g., [29] ). If P is pε, δq-differentially private, then for every randomized function A, the composed function A˝P is pε, δq-differentially private.
For a positive real number a, logpaq denotes the logarithm base 2 of a, and lnpaq denotes the natural logarithm of a.
Shuffled model
We briefly review the shuffled model of differential privacy introduced by Bittau et al. [10] and formalized by Cheu et al. [16] . The input to the model is a dataset px 1 , . . . , x n q P X n , where the item x i P X is held only by user i. A protocol in the shuffled model is the composition of three algorithms:
• The local randomizer R : X Ñ Y˚takes as input the data of one user, x i P X , and outputs a sequence py i,1 , . . . , y i,m i q of messages; here m i is a positive integer. • The shuffler S : Y˚Ñ Y˚takes as input a sequence of elements of Y, say py 1 , . . . , y m q, and outputs a random permutation, i.e., the sequence py πp1q , . . . , y πpmq q, where π P S m is a uniformly random permutation on rms.
The input to the shuffler will be the concatenation of the outputs of the local randomizers. • The analyzer A : Y˚Ñ Z takes as input a sequence of elements of Y (which will be taken to be the output of the shuffler) and outputs an answer in Z which is taken to be the output of the protocol P . We will write P " pR, S, Aq to denote the protocol whose components are given by R, S, and A. It is evident that the main distinction between the shuffled and local model is the introduction of the shuffler S between the local randomizer and the analyzer. Similar to the local model, in the shuffled model the analyzer is untrusted; hence privacy must be guaranteed with respect to the input to the analyzer, i.e., the output of the shuffler. Formally, we have: Definition 2.2 (Differential privacy in the shuffled model, [16] ). A protocol P " pR, S, Aq is pε, δq-differentially private if, for any dataset X " px 1 , . . . , x n q, the algorithm px 1 , . . . , x n q Þ Ñ SpRpx 1 q, . . . , Rpx nis pε, δq-differentially private.
Notice that the output of SpRpx 1 q, . . . , Rpx ncan be simulated by an algorithm that takes as input the multiset consisting of the union of the elements of Rpx 1 q, . . . , Rpx n q (which we denote as Ť i Rpx i q, with a slight abuse of notation) and outputs a uniformly random permutation of them. Thus, by Lemma 2.1, it can be assumed without loss of generality for privacy analyses that the shuffler simply outputs the multiset Ť i Rpx i q. For the purpose of analyzing accuracy of the protocol P " pR, S, Aq, we define its output on the dataset X " px 1 , . . . , x n q to be ApSpRpx 1 q, . . . , Rpx n.
Frequency oracle
We now describe a basic data primitive that we study in this paper. Fix positive integers B and k ď B as well as positive real numbers α and β. In the pα, β, kq-frequency oracle problem [36, 7] , each user i P rns holds a subset S i Ă rBs of size at most k. Equivalently, user i holds the sum of the one-hot encodings of the elements of S i , i.e., the vector x i P t0, 1u B such that px i q j " 1 if and only if j P S i . Note that }x i } 1 ď k for all i.
The goal is to design a (possibly randomized) data structure FO and a deterministic algorithm A (frequency oracle) that takes as input the data structure FO and an index j P rBs, and outputs in time T an estimatex j P R that, with high probability, is within an additive α from ř n i"1 px i q j . Formally: Definition 2.3 (pα, β, kq-frequency oracle). A protocol with inputs x 1 , . . . , x n P t0, 1u B computes an pα, β, kqfrequency oracle if it outputs a pair pFO, Aq such that for all datasets px 1 , . . . , x n q, P « @j P rBs :ˇˇˇˇApFO, jq´n
The probability in the above expression is over the randomness in creating the data structure FO.
Note that given such a frequency oracle, one can recover the 2α-heavy hitters, namely those j such that ř n i"1 px i q j ě 2α, in time OpT Bq, by querying ApFO, 1q, . . . , ApFO, Bq. (See the remark after Theorem 3.6.)
Frequency oracle and heavy hitters
Most prior work [7, 6, 11] has focused on the case of computing heavy hitters when each user holds only a single element, i.e., the case k " 1 of the pα, β, kq-frequency oracle. In this paper our focus is also primarily on the case when k " 1 and we do not try to optimize our algorithms for large k. However, in the application to computing range queries (Section 4), we will apply our protocols for a frequency oracle as a black box, and will need to deal with the case when k may be larger than 1; in particular, k will grow at most poly logpnq. When k ą 1 and α " Ωpnq, the pα, β, kq-frequency oracle problem has also been referred to as that of (differentially private) selection [16, 44] .
Protocol based on count-min sketch
In this subsection, we give a public-coin protocol for finding heavy hitters in the shuffled model with error poly log n and communication per user poly log n bits. Our protocol is based on combining the count-min sketch [19] and the privacy blanket [5] .
Overview. We start by recalling the main idea behind the count-min sketch. Assume that each of n users holds an input from rBs where n ! B. We hash the universe rBs into s buckets where s " Opnq. Then for each user, we increment the bucket to which its input hashes. This ensures that for every element of rBs, its hash bucket contains an overestimate of the number of users having that element as input. However, these bucket values are not enough to unambiguously recover the number of users holding any specific element of rBs-this is because on average, B{s different elements hash to the same bucket. To overcome this, the count-min sketch repeats the above idea τ " Oplog Bq times using independent hash functions. 2 Doing so ensures that for each element j P rBs, it is the case that (i) no other element j 1 P rBs hashes to the same buckets as j for all τ repetitions, and (ii) for at least one repetition, no element of rBs that is held by a user (except possibly j itself) hashes to the same bucket as j. To make the count-min data structure differentially private, we use a privacy blanket as was done by Balle et al. [5] . Specifically, we ensure that sufficient independent noise is added to each bucket of each repetition of the count-min data structure. This is done by letting each user independently increment every bucket with a very small probability. The full description of our protocol appears in Algorithm 1.
Analysis. We next state the lemmas summarizing the accuracy, efficiency, and privacy guarantees of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 3.1 (Accuracy of P CM ). Let n, B, and τ be positive integers and let γ P r0, 1s be a real parameter. Then, the estimatex j produced by Q CM on input j P rBs and as an outcome of the shuffled-model protocol
Proof. We consider the entries tCrt, h t rjss | t P rτ su of the noisy count-min data structure. We first consider the error due to the other inputs that are held by the users. Then, we consider the error due to the privacy blanket. We bound each of these two errors with high probability and then apply a union bound. First, we note that for any element j P rBs, the probability that for every repetition index t P rτ s, some element j 1 P rBs held by one of the users (except possibly j itself) satisfies h t pj 1 q " h t pjq, is at most pkn{sq τ .
It remains to show that with probability at least 1´2 Θplogpsτ q´γnq , the absolute value of the blanket noise in each of these entries is at most O pγnq. By a union bound over all sτ pairs of bucket indices and repetition indices, Algorithm 1: Local randomizer, analyzer and query for heavy hitter computation via count-min. 1 R CM pn, B, τ, γ, sq:
Input: Subset S Ă rBs specifying the user's input set Parameters: n, B, τ, s P N and γ P r0, 1s Public Randomness: A random hash family th t : rBs Ñ rss, @t P rτ su Output: A multiset T Ă rτ sˆrss 2 for j P S do 3 for t P rτ s do 4 Add the pair pt, h t pjqq to T . 5 for t P rτ s do 6 for P rss do
Add the pair pt, q to T . 10 return T . 11 A CM pn, B, τ, sq: Input: Multiset ty 1 , . . . , y m u containing outputs of local randomizers Parameters: n, B, τ, s P N Public Randomness: A random hash family th t : rBs Ñ rss, @t P rτ su Output: A noisy count-min data structure C : rτ sˆrss Ñ N 12 for t P rτ s do 13 for P rss do 14 Crt, s " 0. 15 for j P rms do 16 Cry j s Ð Cry j s`1. 17 return C 18 Q CM pn, B, τ, sq: Input: Element j P rBs Parameters: n, B, τ, s P N Public Randomness: A random hash family th t : rBs Ñ rss, @t P rτ su Output: A non-negative real number which is an estimate of the frequency of element j 19 returnx j :" mintCrt, h t rjss : t P rτ su it is enough to show that for each t P rτ s and each P rss, with probability at least 1´2´Θ pγnq , the absolute value of the blanket noise in Crt, h t rjss is at most O pγnq. This follows from the fact that the blanket noise in the entry Crt, h t rjss is the sum of n independent Berpγq random variables (one contributed by each user). The bound now follows from the multiplicative Chernoff bound. Finally, by a union bound, we get that the overall error is at most O pγnq with probability at least 1´pkn{sq τ2 Θplogpsτ q´γnq .
Note that the protocol based on count-min never underestimates the count of an element. (However, this will not be the case for the protocol based on the Hadamard response (Section 3.5).) Lemma 3.2 (Efficiency of P CM ). Let n, B, τ, s be positive integers and γ P r0, 1s. Then, 1. With probability at least 1´n¨2´Θ pγsτ q , the output of R CM pn, B, τ, γ, sq on input S consists of at most |S|`Opγsτ q messages each consisting of rlog 2 pτ qs`rlog 2 psqs bits.
2. The runtime of the analyzer A CM pn, B, τ, sq on input ty 1 , . . . , y m u is Opτ s`mq and the space of the data structure that it outputs is Opτ s log mq bits. 3. The runtime of any query Q CM pn, B, τ, sq is Opτ q.
Proof. The second and third parts follow immediately from the operation of Algorithm 1. To prove the first part, we note that each user sends |S| messages corresponding to its inputs along with a number of "blanket noise" terms. This number is a random variable drawn from the binomial distribution Binpτ s, γq. Moreover, each of these messages is a pair consisting of a repetition index (belonging to rτ s) and a bucket index (belonging to rss). The proof now follows from the multiplicative Chernoff bound along with a union bound over all n users. , the algorithm S˝R CM pn, B, τ, γ, sq is pε, δq-differentially private.
The proof of Lemma 3.3 uses some general tools linking sensitivity of vector-valued functions, smoothness of distributions and approximate differential privacy-these are given next.
Approximate differential privacy for insensitive functions
To prove Lemma 3.3, we will need some general tools linking sensitivity of vector-valued functions, smoothness of distributions, and approximate differential privacy.
It is well-known [26] that the mechanism given by adding independent Laplacian noise with variance 2∆pf q 2 {ε 2 to each coordinate of f pXq is pε, 0q-differentially private. Laplace noise, however, is unbounded in both the positive and negative directions, and this causes issues in the shuffled model (roughly speaking, it would require each party to send infinitely many messages). In our setting we will need to ensure that the noise added to each coordinate is bounded, so to achieve differential privacy we will not be able to add Laplacian noise. As a result we will only be able to obtain pε, δq-differential privacy for δ ą 0. We specify next the types of noise that we will use instead of Laplacian noise.
Definition 3.2 (Smooth distributions)
. Suppose D is a distribution supported on Z. For k P N, ε ě 0 and δ P r0, 1s, we say that D is pε, δ, kq-smooth if for all´k ď k 1 ď k,
The following lemma formalizes the types of noise we can add to f pXq to obtain such a privacy guarantee. Its proof appears in the Appendix.
Smoothness of binomial distribution
In order to prove Lemma 3.3, we will also use the following statement about the smoothness of the binomial distribution (that we will invoke with a small value of the head probability γ). Its proof appears in the Appendix. 
Privacy proof
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.3 thereby establishing the privacy of Algorithm 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Fix ε, δ. Notice that S˝R CM pn, B, τ, γ, sq can be obtained as a post-processing of the noisy count-min data structure C : rτ sˆrss Ñ N in Algorithm 1, so it suffices to show that the algorithm bringing the players' inputs to this count-min data structure is pε, δq-differentially private. Consider first the count-min data structureC : rτ sˆrss Ñ N with no noise, so thatCrt, s measures the number of inputs x inside some user's set S i such that h t pxq " . We next note that the function mapping the users' inputs pS 1 , . . . , S n q toC has sensitivity (in terms of Definition 3.1) at most kτ and is k-incremental (in terms of Definition 3.3). Moreover, Lemma 3.5 (with α " ε{3) implies that the binomial distribution Binpn, γq is p {pτ kq, δ{pτ kq, kq-smooth (in terms of Definition 3.2) as long as δ ě 2τ ke´ε 2 γn 90 and k ď εγn{p6τ kq. In particular, we need
By construction in Algorithm 1, Crt, ss "Crt, ss`Binpn, γq, where the binomial random variables are independent for each t, s. Applying Lemma 3.4, we get that the count-min data structure is pε, δq-differentially private (with respect to Definition 2.2).
By combining Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3, we immediately obtain the following:
Theorem 3.6. There is a sufficiently large positive absolute constant ζ such that the following holds. Suppose n, B P N, and 0 ď ε, δ ď 1. Consider the shuffled-model protocol P CM " pR CM , S, A CM q with τ " logp2B{βq, s " 2kn, and
Then P CM is pε, δq-differentially private (Definition 2.2) and for inputs x 1 , . . . , x n P t0, 1u B (}x i } 1 ď k), the estimatesx j produced by Q CM satisfy:
Proof. Privacy is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.3. To establish accuracy (i.e., (1)), note first that Lemma 3.1 guarantees that for any j P rBs,x j´ř n i"1 x i,j ď Opγnq with probability at least 1´pkn{sq τ´2ζ 0 plogpsτ q´γnq , for some constant ζ 0 ď 1. Now (1) follows from a union bound over all j P rBs as well as the fact that for sufficiently large ζ,
so that 2 ζ 0 plogpsτ q´γnq ď β{p2Bq.
We remark that the error guarantee as stated in Theorem 3.6 is one-sided, i.e.,x j is always an overestimate of the true frequency ř n i"1 x i,j . If we are willing to sacrifice the one-sided error, the third term in (1) can be decreased from logpτ k{δq
by adding a debiasing step in the analyzer A CM in Algorithm 1. We can immediately apply Theorem 3.6 to recover all the heavy hitters by simply iterating over all elements in rBs, computing an estimate of each count (which would be accurate up to an additive polylogarihmtic factor) and outputting the elements whose count-estimate is larger than a certain (polylogarithmic) threshold. This gives a runtime of OpBq. Algorithm 1 can be combined with the prefix tree idea of Bassily et al. [6] to reduce the server decoding time (for recovering all heavy hitters and their counts up to additive polylogarithmic factors) from OpBq toÕpnq. The combined algorithm would compute rlog 2 pBqs differentially private count-min data structures, one for every prefix length. Then, the efficient decoding procedure would identify the counts of heavy prefixes of each length and only examine the two children of such heavy prefixes (thereby pruning away the subtrees rooted at infrequent prefixes); this reduces the server decoding time toÕpnq.
Protocol based on Hadamard response
The protocol based on the count-min sketch of the previous section achieves nearly optimal (i.e., up to polylogarithmic factors) time and accuracy for computing a pα, β, kq-frequency oracle for k " 1; see Table 1 . However, the protocol relied on the availability of public randomness, i.e., the ability of the server to send a common string of random bits to all users. In this section we address the question of what can be achieved in the absence of such common random bits. The analogous question for local differential privacy (i.e., without shuffling) was considered recently in [2, 1] . These works made use of the Hadamard response for the local randomizers in place of previous techniques which relied on public randomness. The Hadamard response was also used in [17, 18, 41] for similar applications, namely private frequency estimation.
Overview. For B P N that is a power of 2, let H B P t´1, 1u BˆB denote the BˆB Hadamard matrix and for j P rBs, set H B,j :" tj 1 P rBs | H j,j 1 " 1u. By orthogonality of the rows of H B , we have that |H B,j | " B{2 and for all j ‰ j 1 , |H B,j X H B,j 1 | " B{4. For any τ P N, we denote the τ -wise Cartesian product of H B,j by H τ B,j Ă rBs τ . In the Hadamard response [2] , a user whose data consists of index j P rBs sends to the server a random index j 1 P rBs that is chosen uniformly at random from H B,j with probability e ε 1`e ε and is otherwise chosen uniformly from rBszH B,j with probability 1 1`e ε . In the shuffled model, much less randomization is needed to protect a user's privacy than in the local model of differential privacy where the Hadamard response, as described above, was previously applied. In particular, we can allow the users to send more information about their data to the server, along with some "blanket noise" which helps to hide the true value of any one individual's input. Our adaptation of the Hadamard response to the shuffled model for computing an pα, β, kq-frequency oracle proceeds as follows (Algorithm 2). Suppose the n users possess data S 1 , . . . , S n Ă rBs such that |S i | ď k; equivalently, they possess x 1 , . . . , x n P t0, 1u B , such that for each i P rns, }x i } 1 ď k (the nonzero indices of x i are the elements of S i ). Given x i , the local randomizer R Had augments its input by adding k´}x i } 1 arbitrary elements from the set tB`1, . . . , 2Bu (recall that k ď B). (Later, the analyzer will simply ignore the augmented input in tB`1, . . . , 2Bu from the individual randomizers. The purpose of the augmentation is to guarantee that all sets S i will have cardinality exactly k, which facilitates the privacy analysis.) Let the augmented input be denotedx i , so thatx i P t0, 1u 2B , and }x i } 1 " k. For each index j at which px i q j ‰ 0, the local randomizer chooses τ indices a j,1 , . . . , a j,τ in H 2B,j uniformly and independently, and sends each tuple pa j,1 , . . . , a j,τ q to the shuffler. It also generates ρ tuples pã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,τ q where each ofã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,τ is uniform over r2Bs, and sends these to the shuffler as well; these latter tuples constitute "blanket noise" added to guarantee differential privacy.
Given the output of the shuffler, the analyzer A Had determines estimatesx j for the frequencies of each j P rBs by counting the number of messages pa 1 , . . . , a τ q P r2Bs τ which belong to H τ 2B,j . The rationale is that each user i such that j P S i will have sent such a message in H τ 2B,j . As the analyzer could have picked up some of the "blanket noise" in this count, as well as tuples sent by users holding some j 1 ‰ j, since H τ 2B,j X H τ 2B,j 1 ‰ H, it then corrects this count (Algorithm 2, Line 19) to obtain an unbiased estimatex j of the frequency of j.
Analysis. We next state the theorems summarizing the accuracy, efficiency, and privacy guarantees of Algorithm 2. Proof. For convenience let P :" S˝R Had pn, B, τ, ρ, kq be the protocol whose pε, δq-differential privacy we wish to establish. With slight abuse of notation, we will assume that P operates on the augmented inputs px 1 , . . . ,x n q (see Algorithm 2, Line 4). In particular, for inputs px 1 , . . . , x n q that lead to augmented inputs px 1 , . . . ,x n q, we will let P px 1 , . . . ,x n q be the output of P when given as inputs x 1 , . . . , x n . Let Y be the set of multisets consisting of elements of t0, 1u log 2Bˆτ ; notice that the output of P lies in Y.
By symmetry, it suffices to show that for any augmented inputs of the formX " px 1 , . . . ,x n´1 ,x n q andX 1 " px 1 , . . . ,x n´1 ,x 1 n q, and for any subset U Ă Y, we have that
PrP px 1 , . . . ,x n q P Us ď e ε¨P rP px 1 , . . . ,x n´1 ,x 1 n q P Us`δ.
We first establish (2) for the special case thatx n ,x 1 n differ by 1 on two indices, say j, j 1 , while having the same 1 norm: in particular, we have |px n q j´px 1 n q j | " 1 and |px n q j 1´px 1 n q j 1 | " 1. By symmetry, without loss of generality we may assume that j " 0, j 1 " 1 and that px n q j´px 1 n q j " 1 while px 1 n q j 1´px n q j 1 " 1. To establish (2) in this case, we will in fact prove a stronger statement: for inputs px 1 , . . . ,x n q, define the view of an adversary, View P px 1 , . . . ,x n q, as the tuple consisting of the following components:
• For each i P rn´1s, the setŜ i :" Ť j:px i q j "1 tpa j,1 , . . . , a j,τ qu of tuples output by user i corresponding to her true inputx i . • The setŜ n :" Ť j:jRt0,1u,pxnq j "1 tpa j,1 , . . . , a j,τ qu of tuples output by user n corresponding to her true (augmented) inputx n , except (if applicable) the string that would be output if px n q 1 " 1 or px n q 0 " 1.
• The multiset ty 1 , . . . , y m u consisting of the outputs of the n users of the protocol P . It then suffices to show the following:
(See [5, Theorem 3.1] for a similar argument.) Notice that each of the elements y 1 , . . . , y m in the output of the protocol P consists of a tuple pa 1 , . . . , a τ q, where each a 1 , . . . , a τ P r2Bs. Now we will define a joint distribution (denoted by D) of random variables pW a 1 ,...,aτ q a 1 ,...,aτ Pr2Bs , Q, Q 1 , where, for each pa 1 , . . . , a τ q P r2Bs τ , W a 1 ,...,aτ P Z ě0 , and Q, Q 1 P r2Bs τ , as follows. For each tuple pa 1 , . . . , a τ q P r2Bs τ , let W a 1 ,...,aτ be jointly distributed from a multinomial distribution over r2Bs τ with ρn trials. For each pa 1 , . . . , a τ q P r2Bs τ , letŴ a 1 ,...,aτ be the random variable representing the number of tuples pã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,τ q generated on Line 8 of Algorithm 2 satisfying pã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,τ q " pa 1 , . . . , a τ q. Notice that the joint distribution of all W a 1 ,...,aτ is the same as the joint distribution ofŴ a 1 ,...,aτ , for pa 1 , . . . , a τ q P r2Bs τ . Intuitively, W a 1 ,...,aτ represents the "blanket noise" added by the outputs pã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,τ q in Line 8 of Algorithm 2. Also let Q, Q 1 P r2Bs τ be random variables that are distributed uniformly over H τ 0 , H τ 1 , respectively. Then since the tuples pã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,τ q are distributed independently of the tuples pa j,1 , . . . , a j,τ q (j P S i ), (3) is equivalent to P wa 1 ,...,aτ ,q,q 1 "D « P Wa 1 ,...,aτ ,Q,Q 1 "D r@pa 1 , . . . , aτ q P r2Bs τ : Wa 1 ,...,aτ`1rQ " pa 1 , . . . , aτ qs " wa 1 ,...,aτ`1rq " pa 1 , . . . , aτ qss P Wa 1 ,...,aτ ,Q,Q 1 "D r@pa 1 , . . . , aτ q P r2Bs τ : Wa 1 ,...,aτ`1rQ 1 " pa 1 , . . . , aτ qs " wa 1 ,...,aτ`1rq " pa 1 , . . . , aτ qss ě e ε ff ď δ.
Setw a 1 ,...,aτ :" w a 1 ,...,aτ`1 rq " pa 1 , . . . , a τ qs. By the definition of D we have P Wa 1 ,...,aτ ,Q,Q 1 "D r@pa 1 , . . . , a τ q P r2Bs τ : W a 1 ,...,aτ`1 rQ " pa 1 , . . . , a τ qs "w a 1 ,...,aτ s " E Q"D " p2Bq´τ ρn¨ˆp 2Bq τ tw a 1 ,...,aτ´1 rQ " pa 1 , . . . , a τ qsu pa 1 ,...,aτ qPr2Bs τ˙ "ˆ2 2B˙τ¨p 2Bq´τ ρnˆp 2Bq τ tw a 1 ,...,aτ u pa 1 ,...,aτ qPr2Bs τ˙¨ÿ a 1 1 ,...,a 1 τ PH 0w a 1 1 ,...,a 1 τ .
In the above equation, the notation such as`p 2Bq τ twa 1 ,...,aτ u pa 1 ,...,aτ qPr2Bs τ˘r efers to the multinomial coefficient, equal to pp2Bq τ q! ś a 1 ,...,aτ Pr2Bsw a 1 ,...,aτ . Similarly, for the denominator of the expression in (4), P Wa 1 ,...,aτ ,Q,Q 1 "D " @pa 1 , . . . , a τ q P r2Bs τ : W a 1 ,...,aτ`1 rQ 1 " pa 1 , . . . , a τ qs "w a 1 ,...,aτ ‰ " E Q"D " p2Bq´τ ρn¨ˆp 2Bq τ tw a 1 ,...,aτ´1 rQ 1 " pa 1 , . . . , a τ qsu pa 1 ,...,aτ qPr2Bs τ˙ "ˆ2 2B˙τ¨p 2Bq´τ ρnˆp 2Bq τ tw a 1 ,...,aτ u pa 1 ,...,aτ qPr2Bs τ˙¨ÿ
Thus, (4) is equivalent to
Notice that ř a 1 1 ,...,a 1 τ PH 2B,0w a 1 1 ,...,a 1 τ is distributed as 1`Binpρn, 2´τ q, since q P H τ 2B,0 with probability 1 (by definition of D), and each of the ρn trials in determining the counts w a 1 ,...,aτ belongs to H 2B,0 with probability 2´τ . Similarly, ř a 1 1 ,...,a 1 τ PH 2B,1w a 1 1 ,...,a 1 τ is distributed as Binpρn`1, 2´τ q; notice in particular that q, which is distributed uniformly over H τ 2B,0 , is in H τ 2B,1 with probability 2´τ . By the multiplicative Chernoff bound, we have that, for η ď 1,
As long as we take ρ " 36 lnp1{δq ε 2 , (6) will be satisfied with η " ε{6, which in turn implies (5) since
where the second inequality above uses pρ`1q{ρ ď e ε{2 for our choice of ρ.
We have thus established (2) for the case thatx n ,x 1 n differ by 1 on two indices. For the general case, consider any neighboring datasets X " px 1 , . . . ,x n q and X 1 " px 1 , . . . ,x n´1 ,x 1 n q; we can find a sequence of at most k´1 intermediate datasets px 1 , . . . ,x n´1 ,x pµq n q, 1 ď µ ď k´1 such thatx pµq n andx pµ´1q n differ by 1 on two indices. Applying (2) to each of the k neighboring pairs in this sequence, we see that for any U Ă Y, PrP pXq P Us ď e kε¨P rP pX 1 q P Us`δ¨p1`e ε`¨¨¨`epk´1qε q ď e kε¨P rP pX 1 q P Us`δ¨2 e kε ε ,
where we have used ε ď 1 in the final inequality above. Proof. Fix any j P rBs. Let ζ j " ř n i"1 px i q j . We will upper bound the probability that ξ j :"x j´ζj is large. Notice that the distribution ofx j is given by
This is because each of the ρn tuples pã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,ρ q chosen uniformly from r2Bs τ on Line 8 of Algorithm 2 has probability 2´τ of belonging to H τ 2B,j , and each of the kn´ζ j tuples pa j 1 ,1 , . . . , a j 1 ,τ q (for j 1 P S i , j 1 ‰ j, i P rns)
chosen uniformly from H τ 2B,j 1 in Line 6 of Algorithm 2 also has probability 2´τ of belonging to H τ 2B,j . (Moreover, each of the ζ j tuples pa j,1 , . . . , a j,τ q chosen in Line 6 of the local randomizer always belongs to H τ 2B,j .) Therefore, the distribution of ξ j is given by
inpρn`kn´ζ j , 2´τ q´pρn`kn´ζ j q2´τ˘.
Using that τ " log n, we may rewrite the above as n n´1¨p
Binppρ`k´ζ j {nq¨n, 1{nq´pρ`k´ζ j {nqq .
For any reals c ą 0 and 0 ď η ď 1, by the Chernoff bound, we have P ξ"Binpcn,1{nq r|z´c| ą ηcs ď 2 expˆ´η 2 c 3˙.
Moreover, for η ą 1, we have P ξ"Binpcn,1{nq r|z´c| ą ηcs ď 2 expˆ´η c 3˙.
We have 2 expp´η 2 c{3q ď β{B as long as η ě a 3 lnp2B{βq{c. Set c " ρ`k´ζ j {n, so that ρ ď c ď ρ`k. First suppose that a 3 lnp2B{βq{pρ`k´ζ j {nq ď 1. Then we see that
In the other case, namely ρ`k´ζ j {n " c ă 3 lnp2B{βq, set η " 3 lnp2B{βq{c, and we see that
The combination of (7) and (8) , and if its input ty 1 , . . . , y m u is the output of the local randomizers on input x 1 , . . . , x n (so that m " npρ`kq), there is a modification of the implementation of A Had in Algorithm 2 that, for β P r0, 1s, completes in time Oppρ`kqn log 3 B`knB log 1{βq with probability 1´β. 3. There is a separate modification of A Had pn, B, τ, ρ, kq that on input ty 1 , . . . , y m u produces an output data structure pFO, Aq with space Opmτ log Bq bits, such that a single query ApFO, jq of some j P rBs takes time Opmτ log Bq.
Proof. The first item is immediate from the definition of R Had in Algorithm 2. For the second item, note first that A Had as written in Algorithm 2 takes time OpBmτ log Bq: for each message y i " pa i,1 , . . . , a i,τ q, it loops through each j P rBs to check if each a i,g P H 2B,j for 1 ď g ď τ (determination of whether a i,g P H 2B,j takes time Oplog Bq). Now suppose that the messages y 1 , . . . , y m are the union of the multisets output by each of n shufflers on input x 1 , . . . , x n . Notice that, for messages of the form pa j,1 , . . . , a j,τ q P H 2B,j (Line 6 of Algorithm 2), the number of j 1 such that pa j,1 , . . . , a j,τ q Ă H 2B,j 1 is distributed as 1`Binp2B´1, 1{nq (recall τ " log n). Moreover, for messages of the form pã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,τ q (Line 8 of Algorithm 2), the number of j 1 such that pã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,τ q Ă H 2B,j 1 is distributed as Binp2B, 1{nq. Therefore, by the multiplicative Chernoff bound, for any 0 ď β ď 1, the sum, over all j 1 P rBs, of the number of messages pa 1 , . . . , a τ q that belong to H 2B,j is bounded above by kn`4
Bnp1`lnp1{βqq n " kn`4Bp1`lnp1{βqq (9) with probability 1´β. Next, consider any individual message y i " pa i,1 , . . . , a i,τ q (as on Line 16) . Notice that the set of j such that ta i,1 , . . . , a i,τ u Ă H 2B,j can be described as follows: write j " pj 1 , . . . , j log 2B q P t0, 1u 2B to denote the binary representation of j, and arrange the log 2B-bit binary representations of each of a i,1 , . . . , a i,τ to be the rows of a τˆlog 2B matrix A P t0, 1u τˆlog 2B . Then ta i,1 , . . . , a i,τ u Ă H 2B,j if and only if Aj " 0, where arithmetic is performed over F 2 . This follows since for binary representations i " pi 1 , . . . , i log 2B q P t0, 1u log 2B and j " pj 1 , . . . , j log 2B q P t0, 1u log 2B , the pi, jq-element of H B is p´1q
itjt . Using Gaussian elimination one can enumerate the set of j P t0, 1u log 2B in the kernel of A in time proportional to the sum of Oplog 3 Bq and the number of j in the kernel. Since the number of such j is bounded above by p9q, the total running time of this modification of A Had becomes Oppρ`kqn log 3 B`kn`B logp1{βqq.
For the last item of the theorem, the analyzer simply outputs the collection of all tuples y i " pa i,1 , . . . , a i,τ q; to query the frequency of some j P rBs, we simply run the for loop on Line 14 of Algorithm 2, together with the debiasing step of Line 19.
Range queries
We recall the definition of range queries. Let X " rBs and consider a dataset X " px 1 , . . . , x n q P rBs n . A counting query is specified by a vector w P R B , and the answer to this counting query on the dataset X is given by xw, histpXqy. Here x¨,¨y denotes the Euclidean inner product; throughout the paper, we slightly abuse notation and allow an inner product to be taken of a row vector and a column vector. A 1-dimensional range query rj, j 1 s, where 1 ď j ď j 1 ď B, is a counting query such that w j " w j`1 "¨¨¨" w j 1 " 1, and all other entries of w are 0. For d-dimensional range queries, the elements of rBs will map to points on a d-dimensional grid, and a certain subset of vectors w P t0, 1u B represent the d-dimensional range queries. In this section, we use the frequency oracle protocols in Section 3 to derive protocols for computing counting queries with per-user communication poly logpBq and additive error poly logpmaxtn, Buq.
In Section 4.1, we adapt the matrix mechanism of [39, 40] to use the frequency oracle protocols of Section 3 as a black-box for computation of counting queries, which include range queries as a special case. In Section 4.2, we instantiate this technique for the special case of 1-dimensional range queries, and in Section 4.3 we consider the case of multi-dimensional range queries. In Section 4.4 we collect the results from Sections 4.1 through 4.3 to formally state our guarantees on range query computation in the shuffled model, as well as the application to M -estimation of the median, as mentioned in the introduction.
Reduction to private frequency oracle via the matrix mechanism
Our protocol for computing range queries is a special case of a more general protocol, which is in turn inspired by the matrix mechanism of [39, 40] . We begin by introducing this more general protocol and explaining how it allows Choose a j,1 , . . . , a j,τ P H 2B,j uniformly and independently at random 7 for g " 1, 2, . . . , ρ do 8 Chooseã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,τ P r2Bs uniformly and independently at random 9 return T :" Ť jPS tpa j,1 , . . . , a j,τ qu Y Ť 1ďgďρ tpã g,1 , . . . ,ã g,τ qu // Each element of T is in pt0, 1u log 2B q τ . For any column vector y P R B , ∆ M measures the maximum 1 change in M y if a single element of y changes by 1. The matrix mechanism, introduced by Li et al. [39, 40] in the central model of differential privacy, allows one to release answers to a given set of counting queries in a private manner. It is parametrized by an invertible matrix M , and given input X, releases the following noisy perturbation of histpXq:
where z P R B is a random vector whose components are distributed i.i.d. according to some distribution calibrated to the privacy parameters ε, δ. The response to a counting query w P R B is then given by xw, histpXq`∆ M¨M´1 zy. The intuition behind the privacy of (10) is as follows: (10) can be obtained as a post-processing of the mechanism X Þ Ñ M phistpXqq`∆ M¨z , namely via multiplication by M´1. If we choose, for instance, each z i to be an independent Laplacian of variance 2{ε, then the algorithm X Þ Ñ M phistpXqq`∆ M¨z is simply the Laplace mechanism, which is pε, 0q-differentially private [26] . In our modification of the matrix mechanism, the parties will send data that allows the analyzer to directly compute the "pre-processed input" M phistpXqq`∆ M¨z . Moreover, due to limitations of the shuffled model and to reduce communication, the distribution of the noise z will be different from what has been previously used [39, 40] . For our application, we will require M to satisfy the following properties:
(1) For any counting query w corresponding to a d-dimensional range query, wM´1 has at most poly logpBq nonzero entries, and all of those nonzero entries are bounded in absolute value by some c ą 0. (Here w P t0, 1u B is viewed as a row vector.) (2) ∆ M ď poly logpBq. By property (2) above and the fact that all entries of M are in t0, 1u, (approximate) computation of the vector M phistpXqq can be viewed as an instance of the frequency oracle problem where user i P rns holds the ď poly logpBq nonzero entries of the vector M phistpx i qq. This follows since M phistpx iis the x i th column of M , ∆ M ď poly logpBq, and histpXq " ř n i"1 histpx i q. Moreover, suppose there is some choice of local randomizer and analyzer (such as those in Section 3) that approximately solve the frequency oracle problem, i.e., compute an approximationŷ of M phistpXqq up to an additive error of poly log B, in a differentially private manner. Since wM´1 has at most poly logpBq nonzero entries, each of magnitude at most c, it follows that xwM´1,ŷy
approximates the counting query xw, histpXqy up to an additive error of c¨poly logpBq. Perhaps surprisingly, for any constant d ě 1, we will be able to find a matrix M that satisfies properties (1) and (2) above for d-dimensional range queries with c " 1. This leads to the claimed poly logpBq error for computation of d-dimensional range queries, as follows: the local randomizer R matrix (Algorithm 3) is parametrized by integers n, B P N, a matrix M P t0, 1u BˆB , and a local randomizer R FO : rBs Ñ T˚that can be used in a shuffled model protocol that computes a frequency oracle. (Here T is an arbitrary set, and R FO computes a sequence of messages in T .) Given input x P rBs, R matrix returns the output of R FO when given as input the set of nonzero entries of the xth column of M . The corresponding analyzer A matrix (Algorithm 4) is parametrized by integers n, B P N, a matrix M P t0, 1u BˆB , and an analyzer A FO for computation of a frequency oracle in the shuffled model. Given a multiset S consisting of the shuffled messages output by individual randomizers R matrix , it returns (11), namely the inner product of wM´1 and the output of A FO when given S as input. To complete the construction of a protocol for range query computation in the shuffled model, it remains to find a matrix M satisfying properties (1) and (2) above. We will do so in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. First we state here the privacy and accuracy guarantees of the shuffled protocol P matrix " pR matrix , S, A matrix q. Proof. Let Y be the message space of the randomizer R FO , and Y 1 be the set of multisets consisting of elements of Y. Let P " S˝R matrix pn, B, M, R FO q. Consider neighboring datasets X " px 1 , . . . , x n q P rBs n and X 1 " return Map associating each w P W to f w :" ř jPrBs:pwM´1q j ‰0 pwM´1q j¨A pFO, jq // Let y P R B be such thatŷ j " ApFO, jq; then this returns the map associating w P W to xwM´1,ŷy. px 1 , . . . , x n´1 , x 1 n q P rBs n . We wish to show that for any T Ă Y,
PrP pXq P T s ď e ε¨P rP pX 1 q P T s`δ.
For i P rns, let S i " tj P rBs : M j,x i ‰ 0u and S 1 n " tj P rBs : M j,x 1 n ‰ 0u. Since ∆ M ď k, we have |S i | ď k for i P rns and |S 1 n | ď k. Since the output of R matrix on input x i is simply R FO pS i q, P pXq " SpR FO pS 1 q, . . . , R FO pS n qq, P pX 1 q " SpR FO pS 1 q, . . . , R FO pS n´1 q, R FO pS 1 n qq. Then (12) follows by the fact that pS 1 , . . . , S n q and pS 1 , . . . , S n´1 , S 1 n q are neighboring datasets for the pα, β, kqfrequency problem and S˝R FO is pε, δq-differentially private. . , x n q, let the (random) estimates produced by the protocol P matrix on input X be denoted by f w P r0, 1s (w P W). Then: P r@w P W : |f w´x w, histpXqy| ď α¨as ě 1´β.
Moreover, if the set of nonzero entries of wM´1 and their values can be computed in time T , and A Had releases a frequency oracle pFO, Aq which takes time T 1 to query an index j, then for any w P W, the estimate f w can be computed in time OpT`a¨T 1 q by A matrix .
Proof. For i P rns, let S i " tj P rBs : M j,x i ‰ 0u be the set of nonzero entries of the x i th column of M . Denote by pFO, Aq the frequency oracle comprising the output A FO pSpR FO pS 1 q, . . . , R FO pS n. Defineŷ P R B byŷ j " ApFO, jq, for j P rBs. Then the output of P matrix , namely P matrix pXq " A matrix pSpR matrix px 1 q, . . . , R matrix px n, is given by the map associating each w P W to xwM´1,ŷy (Algorithms 3 and 4).
Since pFO, Aq is an pα, β, kq-frequency oracle, we have that P r}ŷ´histpS 1 , . . . , S n q} 8 ď αs ě 1´β.
Notice that the histogram of S i is given by the x i th column of M , which is equal to M histpx i q. Thus histpS 1 , . . . , S n q " M histpx 1 , . . . , x n q. By Holder's inequality, it follows that with probability 1´β, for all w P W,ˇx wM´1,ŷy´xwM´1, M histpx 1 , . . . , x n qyˇˇď α¨}wM´1} 1 ď α¨a.
But xwM´1, M histpx 1 , . . . , x n qy " wM´1M histpx 1 , . . . , x n q " xw, histpx 1 , . . . , x n qy is the answer to the counting query w. This establishes (13) . The final claim involving efficiency follows directly from Line 3 of Algorithm 4. Figure 2 : (a) The range query tree T 4 . The nodes in C 4 are highlighted in red. The labels y t,s , z s next to nodes show the values stored at the nodes and the relations between them. Notice that in the case B " 4, we have pt 1 , s 1 q " p0, 1q, pt 2 , s 2 q " p1, 1q, pt 3 , s 3 q " p2, 1q, pt 4 , s 4 q " p2, 3q. (b) The path P described in (14) for j " 4 is highlighted in blue. For this case (B " j " 4) we have z 4 " y 0,1´y1,2´y2,3 .
Single-dimensional range queries
We first present the matrix M discussed in previous section for the case of d " 1, i.e., single-dimensional range queries. In this case, the set X " rBs is simply identified with B consecutive points on a line, and a range query rj, j 1 s is specified by integers j, j 1 P rBs with j ď j 1 . We will assume throughout that B is a power of 2. (This assumption is without loss of generality since we can always pad the input domain to be of size a power of 2, with the loss of a constant factor in our accuracy bounds.) We begin by presenting the basic building block in the construction of M , namely that of a range query tree T B with B leaves and a chosen set C B of B nodes of T B : For a depth 0 ď t ď log B and an index 1 ď s ď B{2 log B´t , let v t,s be the sth vertex of the tree at depth t (starting from the left). We will denote the value stored at vertex v t,s by y t,s . The values y t,s will always have the property that y t,s " y t`1,2s´1`yt`1,2s ; i.e., the value stored at v t,s is the sum of the values stored at the two children of v t,s . 2. Let C B " tv t,s : 0 ď t ď log B, s " 1 pmod 2qu. Let the B nodes in C B be ordered in the top-to-bottom, left-to-right order. In particular, v 0,1 comes first, v 1,1 is second, v 1,3 is third, v 2,1 is fourth, and in general: the jth node in this ordering (1 ă j ď B) is v t j ,s j , where t j " rlog 2 js, s j " 2pj´2 t j´1 q´1. 3. For 1 ď j ď B, we will denote z j :" y log B,j and y j " y t j ,s j . See Figure 2 for an illustration of T 4 . The next lemma establishes some basic properties of the set C B : Proof of Lemma 4.3. The first part is immediate from the definition of C B . For the second part, given u, we walk towards the root, continually going to the parent of the current node. The first time we arrive at a node that is the left child of its parent, we will be at a node in C B ; we let this node be v.
Next we make two more definitions that will aid in the analysis:
For an integer j P rBs, let vpjq denote the number of steps from a node to its parent one must take starting at the leaf v log B,j of the tree T B to get to a node in C B . Equivalently, vpjq is the 2-adic valuation of j (i.e., the base-2 logarithm of the largest power of 2 dividing j).
Definition 4.4. For a positive integer j, let cpjq be the number of ones in the binary representation of j.
By property (1) of Definition 4.2, the set of all values y t,s , for 0 ď t ď log B, 1 ď s ď B{2 t , is entirely determined by the values z s : in particular, for any v t,s , y t,s is the sum of all z s for which the leaf v log B,s is a descendant of v t,s . Conversely, given the values of y t,s for which v t,s P C B (equivalently, the values y t j ,s j for j P rBs), the values z j " y log B,j are determined as follows:
Graphically, we follow the path P from v log B,j to the root until we hit a node v t,s in C B ; then z j is the difference of y t,s and the sum of the variables stored at the left child of each node in the path P . (See Figure 2 for an example.) It follows from the argument in the previous paragraph that the linear transformation that sends the vector pz 1 , . . . , z B q to the vector py t 1 ,s 1 , . . . , y t B ,s B q is invertible; let M B P t0, 1u BˆB be the matrix representing this linear transformation. By (14) , which describes the linear transformation induced by M´1 B , we have that M´1 B P t´1, 0, 1u BˆB .
Since each leaf has 1`log B ancestors (including itself), we immediately obtain:
Next consider any range query rj, j 1 s, so that 1 ď j ď j 1 ď B, and let w P R B be the row vector representing this range query (see Section 4.1). In particular all entries of w are 0 apart from w j , w j`1 , . . . , w j 1 , which are all 1. (1) and (2) required of the matrix M " M B to guarantee poly logpBq accuracy and poly logpBq communication for private computation of 1-dimensional range queries. In the following section we use M B to construct a matrix which satisfies the same properties for d-dimensional range queries for any d ě 1.
Multi-dimensional range queries
Fix any d ě 1, and suppose the universe X consists of B 0 buckets in each dimension, i.e., X " rB 0 s d . In this case, a range query rj 1 , j 1 1 sˆrj 2 , j 1 2 sˆ¨¨¨ˆrj d , j 1 d s is specified by integers j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j d , j 1 1 , j 1 2 , . . . , j 1 d P rB 0 s with j i ď j 1 i for all i " 1, 2, . . . , d. Throughout this section, we will consider the case that d is a constant (and B 0 is large). Moreover suppose that B 0 is a power of 2 (again, this is without loss of generality since we can pad each dimension to be a power of 2 at the cost of a blowup in |X | by at most a factor of 2 d ). Write B " |X | " B d 0 . Our goal is to define a matrix M B,d which satisfies analogues of Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 for w P t0, 1u B representing multi-dimensional range queries (when rBs is identified with rB 0 s d ).
The idea behind the construction of M B,d is to apply the linear transformation M B 0 in each dimension, operating on a single-dimensional slice of the input vector pz j 1 ,...,j d q j 1 ,...,j d PrB 0 s (when viewed as a d-dimensional tensor) at a time. Alternatively, M B,d can be viewed combinatorially through the lens of range trees [9] : M B,d is a linear transformation that takes the vector pz j 1 ,...,j d q to a B-dimensional vector whose components are the values stored at the nodes of a range tree defined in a similar manner to the range query tree T B for the case d " 1. However, we opt to proceed linear algebraically: the matrix M B,d is defined as follows. Fix a vector z P R B . We will index the elements of z with d-tuples of integers in rB 0 s, i.e., we will write z " pz j 1 ,...,j d q j 1 ,...,j d PrB 0 s . For 1 ď p ď d, let M pre B,p be the linear transformation that applies M B 0 to each vector pz j 1 ,...,j p´1 ,1,j p`1 ,...,j d , . . . , z j 1 ,...,j p´1 ,B 0 ,j p`1 ,...,j d q, where j 1 , . . . , j p´1 , j p`1 , . . . , j d P rB 0 s. That is, M B 0 is applied to each slice of the vector z, where the slice is being taken along the pth dimension. Then let
We will also use an alternate characterization of M B,d , which we develop next. First identify R B with the d-wise tensor product of R B 0 , in the following (standard) manner: Let e 1 , . . . , e B 0 P R B 0 be the standard basis vectors in R B 0 . Then the collection of all e j 1 b¨¨¨b e j d , where j 1 , . . . , j d P rB 0 s, form a basis for R B 0 b¨¨¨b R B 0 . Under the identification R B » pR B 0 q bd , a vector z " pz j 1 ,...,j d q j 1 ,...,j d PrB 0 s P R B is identified with the following linear combination of these basis vectors:
Under this identification, the matrix M B,d corresponds to the following linear transformation of pR B 0 q bd :
In the following lemmas, we will often abuse notation to allow M B,d to represent both the above linear transformation as well as the matrix in R BˆB representing this transformation.
Lemma 4.6. We have that M B,d P t0, 1u BˆB and the sensitivity of M B,d :
Proof of Lemma 4.6. Notice that the ppj 1 , . . . , j d q, pj 1 1 , . . . , j 1 dentry of M B,d is given by the following product:
of nonzero indices in the pj 1 , . . . , j d q-th column of M B,d is equal to the Cartesian product ą 1ďpďd tj 1 p : pM B 0 q j 1 p ,jp " 1u.
Since each of the sets tj 1 p : pM B 0 q j 1 p ,jp " 1u can be computed in time Oplog B 0 q (using the case d " 1 solved above), and is of size Oplog B 0 q, the product of these sets (19) can be computed in time Oplog d B 0 q, thus completing the proof of item (1) in the lemma.
The proof of item (2) for general d is similar. For 1 ď p ď d, let w p be the vector in R B 0 corresponding to the 1-dimensional range query rj p , j 1 p s. Then recall from (18) we have that wM´1 B,d " w 1 M´1 B 0 b¨¨¨b w d M´1 B 0 . By item (2) for d " 1, the nonzero entries of each of w p M´1 B 0 (and their values) can be computed in time Oplog B 0 q; since each of these sets has size Oplog B 0 q, the set of nonzero entries of wM´1 B,d , which is the Cartesian product of these sets, as well as the values of these entries, can be computed in time Oplog d B 0 q.
Guarantees for differentially private range queries
In this section we state the guarantees of and k " plog 2B 1{d q d . Then:
• The protocol P matrix is pε, δq-differentially private in the shuffled model (Definition 2.2).
• For any dataset X " px 1 , . . . , x n q P prB 0 s d q n , with probability 1´β, the frequency estimate of P matrix for each d-dimensional range query has additive error at most
• With probability at least 1´β, each local randomizer sends a total of at most
essages, each of length Oplogplog B{βq`logpplog 2B 0 q d nqq. Moreover, in time Opnmq, the analyzer produces a data structure of size Opn logpB{βqplog 2B 0 q d logpnmqq bits, such that a single range query can be answered in time Opplog 2B 0 q d¨l og B{βq.
Proof of Theorem 4.9. Lemma 4.6 guarantees that ∆ M B,d ď p1`log B 0 q d " plog 2B 1{d q d . (Recall our notation that B " pB 0 q d .) Then by Theorem 4.1, to show pε, δq-differential privacy of P matrix it suffices to show pε, δqdifferential privacy of the shuffled-model protocol P CM :" pR CM , S, A CM q. For the parameters above this follows from Theorem 3.6.
Next we show accuracy of P matrix . Lemma 4.7 guarantees that for any w P t0, 1u B representing a range query, wM´1 B,d has at most p2 log B 0 q d nonzero entries, all of which are either´1 or 1. Moreover, by Theorem 3.6, the shuffled model protocol P CM provides an pα, β, plog 2B 0 q d q-frequency oracle with
By Theorem 4.2, it follows that with probability 1´β, the frequency estimates of P matrix on each d-dimensional range query have additive error at most Similarly, for the Hadamard response-based frequency oracle, we obtain the following: 
Then:
• For any dataset X " px 1 , . . . , x n q P prB 0 s d q n , with probability 1´β, the frequency estimate of P matrix for each d-dimensional range query has additive accuracy at most Opε´1d 1{2 p2 log Bq 2d¨l ogpplog Bq{pβεδqqq. • The local randomizers send a total of O pn¨ρq messages, each of length Oplog n log Bq. The analyzer can either (a) produce a data structure of size OpB log nq bits such that a single range query can be answered in time Oplog d Bq, or (b) produce a data structure of size Opnρ log nq such that a single range query can be answered in time Opnρ log nq.
Proof of Theorem 4.10. Lemma 4.6 guarantees that ∆ M B,d ď p1`log Bq d " plog 2Bq d . Then by Theorem 4.1, to show pε, δq-differential privacy of P matrix it suffices to show pε, δq-differential privacy of the shuffled-model protocol P Had :" pR Had , S, A Had q. By Theorem 3.7 with k " plog 2Bq d , this holds with ρ as in (20) . (In particular, the parameter ε in Theorem 3.7 is set to ε{plog 2Bq d , and the parameter δ in Theorem 3.7 is set to δ¨ε{pe¨plog 2Bq d .) Next we show accuracy of P matrix . Lemma 4.7 guarantees that for any w P t0, 1u B representing a range query, wM´1 B,d has at most p2 log Bq d nonzero entries, all of which are either´1 or 1. Moreover, by Theorem 3.8 with k " plog 2Bq d and ρ as in (20) , for any 1 ě β ě 0, the shuffled model protocol P Had provides a p a 3 lnp2B{βq¨maxt3 lnp2B{βq, 2ρu, β, plog 2Bq d q -frequency oracle. (Here we have used that k ď ρ.) By Theorem 4.2, it follows that with probability 1´β, the frequency estimates of P matrix on each d-dimensional range query have additive error at most p2 log Bq d¨a 3 lnp2B{βq¨maxt3 lnp2B{βq, 2ρu ď 12p2 log Bq 2d¨a logp2B{βq¨plogpplog 2Bq d`1 {pβδεε , which establishes the claim regarding accuracy of P matrix . To establish the last item (regarding efficiency), notice that the claims regarding communication (the number of messages and message length) follow from Theorem 3.10 with k " plog 2Bq d . Part (a) of the claim regarding efficiency of the analyzer follows from item 2 of Theorem 3.10 and the last sentence in the statement of Theorem 4.2. Part (b) of the claim regarding efficiency of the analyzer follows from item 3 of Theorem 3.10 and the last sentence in the statement of Theorem 4.2.
A Proofs of auxiliary lemmas from Section 3
In this section, we prove Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5. Lemma 3.4. Suppose f : X n Ñ Z m is k-incremental (Definition 3.3) and ∆pf q " ∆. Suppose D is a distribution supported on Z that is pε, δ, kq-smooth. Then the mechanism X Þ Ñ f pXq`pY 1 , . . . , Y m q, where Y 1 , . . . , Y m " D, i.i.d., is pε 1 , δ 1 q-differentially private, where ε 1 " ε¨∆, δ 1 " δ¨∆.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Consider neighboring datasets X " px 1 , . . . , x n´1 , x n q and X 1 " px 1 , . . . , x n´1 , x 1 n q. We will show P y 1 ,...,ym"D " P Y 1 ,...,Ym"D rf pXq`pY 1 , . . . , Y m q " f pXq`py 1 , . . . , y m qs P Y 1 ,...,Ym"D rf pX 1 q`pY 1 , . . . , Y m q " f pXq`py 1 , . . . , y m qs ě e ε 1  ď δ 1 .
To see that (21) suffices to prove the Lemma 3.4, fix any subset S Ă Z m , and write P pXq " f pXq`pY 1 , . . . , Y m q to denote the randomized protocol. Let T denote the set of f pXq`py 1 , . . . , y m q P Z m such that the event in (21) It then suffices to show (21) . For j P rms, let k j " f pXq j´f pX 1 q j . Since the sensitivity of f is ∆, we have ř m j"1 |k j | ď ∆. It follows that (21) is equivalent to P y 1 ,...,ym"D « m ź j"1 P Y j "D rY j " y j s P Y j "D rY j " y j`kj s ě e ε 1 ff ď δ 1 .
For (22) to hold it in turn suffices, by a union bound and the fact that at most ∆ of the k j are nonzero, that for each j with k j ‰ 0,
But (23) follows for ε 1 {∆ " ε, δ 1 {∆ " δ since D is pε, δ, kq-smooth. This completes the proof.
Lemma 3.5. Let n P N, γ P r0, 1{2s, 0 ď α ď 1, and k ď αγn{2. Then, the distribution Binpn, γq is pε, δ, kqsmooth with " lnpp1`αq{p1´αqq and δ " e´α Proof of Lemma 3.5. Recall that for Y " Binpn, γq and 0 ď y ď n, we have PrY " ys " γ y p1´γq n´y`n y˘. Thus, we have that, for any k ě k 1 ě´k, P Y "Binpn,γq rY " ys P Y "Binpn,γq rY " y`k 1 s " p1´γq k 1 γ k 1¨p y`k 1 q!pn´y´k 1 q! y!pn´yq! .
We define the interval E :" rp1´αqγn`k 1 , p1`αqγn´k 1 s where α is any positive constant smaller than 1. As long as k 1 ď αγn{2, E contains the interval E 1 :" rp1´α{2qγn, p1`α{2qγns. By the multiplicative Chernoff Bound, we have that P y"Binpn,γq ry R Es ď e´α 
Note that for any y P E, if k 1 ě 0, it is the case that p1´γq k 1 γ k 1 py`k 1 q!pn´y´k 1 q! y!pn´yq! " p1´γq k 1 γ k 1¨p y`1q¨¨¨py`k 1 q pn´yq¨¨¨pn´y´k 1`1 q ď p1`αq k 1 .
For y P E and if k 1 ď 0, it is the case that p1´γq k 1 γ k 1 py`k 1 q!pn´y´k 1 q! y!pn´yq! " γ |k 1 | p1´γq |k 1 |¨p n´y`1q¨¨¨pn´y`|k 1 |q ypy´1q¨¨¨py´|k 1 |q ďˆp 1´γ`γαq p1´γqp1´αq˙|
where the last inequality above uses γ ď 1{2. We now proceed to show smoothness by conditioning on the event y P E as follows: 
where (28) follows from (25) and (29) follows from (24), (26) , and (27) as well as our choice of ε.
